Editorial by Editors,
University of Pennsylvania
Law Review
And American Law Register
FOUNDED 1852
Published by the University ol Peamlnsai Law School, at 236 Chestrw Street. Phia.
delphia. Pa., and 34th ad Cheftut Streets, PhWelphis. Pa.







The October-November number of the Illinois Review is a
festival publication in honor of John Wigmore to mark the twenty-
fifth year of his service as Professor of Law in Northwestern
University. It contains a series of articles on the theory and
philosophy of law, on comparative law, criminology, legal educa-
tion, legislation and analytical jurisprudence by men, many of
whom bear names of hiternational fame. But it is not of the con-
tents of this magazine, brilliant though they be, but rather of the
person in whose honor these articles are published, that we wish
to speak. Harvard had its Langdell, Pennsylvania its Sharswood,
Michigan its Cooley, but none of these can be compared in real im-
portance to Wigmore, for he is not merely a great lawyer and a
great teacher as the others were, but he is at the same time a
philosopher, an organizer, a scholar with an extraordinary range
of interests and the founder of a series of publications and institu-
tions through which he will in the course of time be looked back to
as a radiant point from which divers profound and energizing in-
fluences on the history, philosophy, pedagogics and formulation of
the law emanated. Wigmore reminds one of those extraordinary
legal figures of the past, like Bacon and Selden, who apparently
knew everything, forgot nothing and were able to inspire a host of
disciples to carry on fruitful work in many fields. In the Green Bag
(80)
NOTES
of January, 1912, there appeared a biographical sketch of Wigmore,
setting forth with insight and enthusiasm, his meaning and influence
in the history of the development of legal thought. Since then his
productivity has not lessened and his constructive talent-has created
new fields for scholarly and practical work.
He has supplemented his monumental work on evidence, which
alone would insure his immortality among lawyers, with "Prin-
ciples of Judicial Proof," elevating the art to the heights of science,
and he has written dozens of articles and notes on a variety of
topics, his originality especially displaying itself in such articles as
"The Terminology of Legal Science," 28 Harv. L. R. I; "The In-
ternational Assimilation of Law," zo Ill. L. R. 385; "Justice Holmes
and the Law of Torts," 29 Harv. L. R. 6oi, and three brilliant lec-
tures, delivered at the University of Virginia Law School (pub-
lished in 4 Va. L. R.). Finally he tendered his genius for organiza-
tion to the Government, which he has been serving in various
capacities since the outbreak of the war, entitling him among other
things to be called Colonel. He will, however, to those who really
know him, never be Colonel Wigmore. Such titles may well be re-
served for lesser men. Neither shoulder straps nor military title
have added anything to the distinction which his native genius long
since conferred upon him. We shall think of him as Professor Wig-
more, the great scholar and teacher, author and editor, or simply as
Wigmore, a fountain of energy and inspiration, or, to use and
combine two Hebrew metaphors, as "a limed pit that ,does not
lose a drop" and "an ever-increasing spring." Wigmore has. been
able to acquire and store up for use whenever needed a most extra-
ordinary volume of knowledge which has not made of him, as of
so many other mere scholars, an "ass carrying books," but has fur-
nished material for his ever-active and ever-expanding intellect to
work upon for the purpose of striking out into new fields of activ-
ity and thought.
We, of Pennsylvania, tender our very sincere congratulations
to Northwestern University Law School and our thanks to Pro-
fessor Wigmore for the many ripe fruits of his scholarship and the
inspiration of his example. David W/erner Anwram.
TAXATIONI-IMIERITANCE TAXE-DEnucroN OF FEDERAL
TAX BEFORE ASSESSING STATE TAx-In the appraisal of an estate
for the purposes of determining the amount of a state inheritance
tax is it proper to deduct the Federal estate tax imposed by the
Revenue Act of September I8, i916?' This is an old question
raised in a new form. The power of Congress to levy an estate
.39 U. S. Stat at Large 756, tit. II, Sec. 2oi; amended March 3, 1917;
39 U. S. Stat at Large xooz.
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tax and the constitutional limits of such legislation may be con-
sidered as settled by Knowlton v. Moore,2 construing the legacy tax
legislation of i898. Mr. Justice White, in an elaborate opinion,
going into the history of death duties in general, points out that
although different methods of .assessing such duties prevail, the
essential feature of such a tax is that "death is the generating
source from which the particular taxing power takes its being, and
that it is the power to transmit, or the transmission from the dead
to the living, on which such taxes are more immediately rested."
Four days after the decision in Knowlton v. Moore, the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a legacy tax paid
to the United States under the Act of June 13, i898,3 was to be
deducted before paying the state succession tax under the Massa-
chusetts Act of igi1. The question, said Chief Justice Holmes,
was not one of precedence between Commonwealth and United
States; but one of justice. "State inheritance tax laws are apt to
aim at seizing all they can get without regard to consistency of
principle, but when it is possible to interpret them to mean what is
just, we must do so." The word "property" as used in the state
-act was held to mean "the property which the legatee would actu-
ally get were it not for the state tax imposed in the sentence in
which the words occur." Two years later a contrary decision was
rendered by the New-York Court of Appeals in Matter of Gihon,'
on the theory that the Federal tax was of exactly the same nature
-as the state tax, a tax on the legatee for the privilege of succeeding
to the property---"the full amount of the legacy is in law paid
to the legatee and the deduction made from it and paid to the
state or Federal government is paid on account of the legatee from
the legacy which he receives."
The Federal Revenue Acts of 1898 and 1916 differ consid-
erably. In the former act the tax was imposed on the particular
legacies or distributive shares, not on the estate as a whole. In
the latter act the tax is laid on the value of the net estate after
allowing certain exemptions provided for in the act. "It being the
purpose and intent of this title that so far as is practicable and
unless otherwise directed by the will of the decedent the tax shall
be paid out of the estate before distribution."' A general view
of the terms of the law lends force to the view expressed by the
Vice Ordinary in the recent case of Roebling's Estate," decided in
178 U. S. 4! (9oo).
S20 U. S. Stat. at Large 448, Secs. 29, 30.
"Hooper v. Shaw, 176 Mass. 19o (goo).
* i69 N. Y. 443 (19o2). Accord: Matter of Irish, 28 X. Y. Misc. 647
(1899) ; Matter of Curtis, 31 N. Y. Misc. 83 (1goo).
Section 2o8, of Act of 1916, supra.
In re Roebling's Estate, ro4 Atlantic Rep. -95 (N. J. 1918).
NOTES
the Prerogative Court of New Jersey, that the Federal tax "is
imposed upon the estate transferred by death and not upon the
succession resulting from death." As the Federal tax was imposed
on the estate and the New Jersey inheritance tax on the succession,
it was held that the Federal tax should be deducted in order to
determine the amount to which the beneficiaries would succeed and
upon the sum so ascertained the state tax should be assessed.
In accord with the fdregoing view there are recent decisions
in Minnesota 6 and Connecticut." The Federal tax, says the Su-
preme Court of Connecticut, "is an obligation against the estate
and payable like any expense which falls under the head of admin-
istration expenses. The tax is no part of the estate at the time
of distribution; it has passed from the estate, and the share of
the beneficiaries is diminished by just so much." Lower court de-
cisions in Pennsylvania are also in accord, 0 following-the principle
of Van Bell's Estate,11 where it was held that sums paid as New
Jersey transfer tax on stocks and bonds should be deducted in
appraising the clear value of the estate subject to collateral inheri-
tance tax in Pennsylvania. Upon this point opinions in other
jurisdictions differ.
12
Recent decisions in New York adhere to the position taken in
Matter of Gihon,13 and contrary to the views above expressed re-
fuse to treat the Federal estate tax as an expense of administration
to be deducted in determining the amount of the state inheritance
tax. 4 The state tax, it is urged, is imposed on the value of the
decedent's property at the time of his death and the deduction of
the Federal tax would diminish the amount which the state has
appropriated as a condition to the transfer from decedent to ben-
eficiary. "The constitutionality of a Federal act entitled to such
a construction and effect," it is said, "might well be doubted." One
may ask why? Indeed, the Minnesota case, referred to above, 5
holds, "that the claim that the Federal tax imposes a tax upon the
estate and not upon the transfer to the beneficiaries and for that
reason is inhibited by the Federal constitution, is not well founded."
* State v. Probate Court of Hennepin Co., 166 N. E. z25 (Minn. 1918).
* Corbin v. Townshend, io3 Atlantic Rep. 647 (Conn. x98).
' Kester's Estate, 21 Pa. Dist. Rep. 147 (1917); Bell's Estate, 27 Pa.
Dist. Rep. 152 (1917) ; Knight's Estate, 27 Pa. Dist. Rep. z73 (1918).
"' 257 Pa. i55 (1917) ; affirming 32 Mont. Co. L. R. 135, and Otto's Estate,
25 Pa. Dist. Pa. 644 (igx6).
" Compare, in accord, on principle, Kingsbury v. Bazeley, 75 N. H. 13
(igo8); Bullard v. Redwood Library, 37 R. I. 107 (igr4); with, contra,
People v. Palmer's Estate, 25 Colo. App. 45o (1914); Matter of Penfold, 216
N. Y. 171 (1915).
"Supra, note s.
"Matter of Bierstadt, 178 N. Y. App. Div. 836 (1917); Matter of Sher-
man, 179 N. Y. App. Div. 497 (i917); affirmed without opinion, 2 N. Y. 54o
" Supra, note &
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The New York doctrine accords with a harsh and grasping policy
in the administration of tax laws, but is within the state's power.
As is shown in Blackstone v. Miller," "The fact that two states,
dealing each with its own law of succession, both of which the
plaintiff irn error has to invoke for her rights, have taxed the right
which they respectively confer, gives no cause for complaint on
constitutional grounds.
W. H. Loyd.
188 U. S. 8 (190o3).
